The Accuracy of Earnings Forecast and Post-ipo Earnings Management by Hutagaol, Y. (Yanthi) et al.
| 345 |
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, Vol.16, No.3 September 2012, hlm. 345–357
Terakreditasi SK. No. 64a/DIKTI/Kep/2010
http://jurkubank.wordpress.com
Korespondensi dengan Penulis:
Yanthi Hutagaol: Telp. Telp. +62 21 720 2222; Fax. +62 21 720 5555
E-mail: yhutagaol@binus.edu
THE ACCURACY OF EARNINGS FORECAST
AND POST-IPO EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Yanthi Hutagaol
Dezie L. Warganegara
Christofer Wibisono
School of Accounting dan Finance BINUS Business School - BINUS University
Jl. Hang Lekir I No. 6, Jakarta, 10270.
Abstract
Prior studies showed that before IPO, many companies conducted earnings management in order to attract
potential investors through impressive earnings figures. This study aimed to investigate the tendency of earn-
ings management practice post - IPO. This practice of earnings management was motivated to preserve managers’
reputation in achieving their earnings forecasts. Using a total of 165 IPOs in IDX during year 2000-2010, this
study employed descriptive analyses to identify the earnings management differences within the sample. A cross-
section analysis was conducted to test the difference of earnings management indicator among the forecasters.
Then, controlling for audit quality, ownership, firm size, and firm leverage, a regression analysis was performed
to test the impact of earnings forecasts accuracy on the earnings management. The result of this research showed
that there was an indication that the forecasters conducted more earnings management than the non-forecasters.
The study found that forecast accuracy was significantly related to managers’ behavior to manage post-IPO
earnings. Further analysis showed that optimistic forecasters tended to engage more in more earning management
than conservative forecasters. The cross section analysis confirmed that optimistic earnings forecast strengthened
the relationship of forecast accuracy and post-IPO earnings management, while high audit quality failed to
weaken it.
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IPO is an event when a company for the first time
sells or offers its share for public in stock market.
One of requirements of company that is going to
register for IPO is to publish prospectus. The docu-
ment is aimed to provide comprehensive company
information to potential investors. In this way, it
is expected to reduce the information asymmetry
between company and investors, as well as, among
investors.
In initial offering prospectus, management
discloses mandatory and voluntary information.
The prospectus mandatory disclosure in Indone-
sia market includes, among others, company pro-
file, IPO arrangements, audited financial state-
ments for a minimum the last three years. More-
over, management is also encouraged to volun-
tarily disclose other materially information that
could help investors to make informed pricing
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decision. One of common voluntary disclosure is
earnings forecast. Usually, management issues
earnings forecast for the end of IPO year.
Earnings management is a direct manage-
ment intervention in finance report process which
is aimed to gain profit or certain benefits, either
for manager or for company (Schipper, 1989). Ac-
cording to Healy & Wahen (1999), the tendency
of earnings management happens when the man-
agement uses their judgment in finance report and
transaction procedures, which is aimed to give
contractual influence and to trick other party to
take decision. Scott (2000) explains that the earn-
ings manipulation motivation happens because it
is eventually done for bonus, contractual motiva-
tion, politic motivation, taxation motivation, the
assigned new CEO, main stock offer, and commu-
nication with investors.
Regarding earnings management in many
IPO studies, there is an argument that explains the
motivation of management to commit to earnings
management prior to IPO. The argument is that
pre-IPO earnings management is used by manag-
ers to increase pre-IPO earnings. Then, pre-IPO
earnings are used as a base for pricing the IPOs.
Thus, it will settle the IPO price in a higher level.
The empirical evidence in Indonesia for this hy-
pothesis is mixed (e.g., Warganegara & Indriastari,
2009).
Earnings Forecast in IPO
In Indonesian market setting, management
earnings forecast is a voluntary disclosure. From
the observation, it is very rare company disclose
its earnings forecasts in the annual reports. Mean-
while, it is common to find earnings forecasts in
the prospectus when company seeks additional
funds from the market through IPO or SEOs (From
167 IPOs in 2000-2010, there were 96 IPOs disclos-
ing earnings forecasts in the offering prospectuses).
Prior studies indicate that there are several
motives for voluntary disclosure. Healy & Wahlen
(1999) argue that company disclose additional in-
formation to public, in order to avoid wrong firm
valuation and enhance the potential investor in-
terest in the company, therefore it may increase
the company’s share liquidity. Therefore, usually
managers are more likely to issue voluntary dis-
closure, for instance, earnings forecast, when firms
access the capital market, such as in the IPO or
SEO markets (Graham, et al, 2005). Meanwhile,
Lennox, & Park (2006) argue that management
voluntary disclosure is aimed to reduce informa-
tion asymmetry either between managers and in-
vestors or among investors. Two motives above
fit to IPO market, which is perceived as a high
information asymmetry market. Hence, in IPO
market earnings forecast disclosure helps to mini-
mize the gap exist between managers and inves-
tors, which could result in lower companies’ cost
of capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997).
There have been many studies examining the
role of earnings forecast on the IPO valuation. Jog
& McConomy (2003) investigate the role of earn-
ings forecast as a signal in IPO valuation process.
They argue that the inclusion of an earnings fore-
cast is to indicate that, on average, the forecasters
have superior future cash flow prospects relatively
to non-forecasters and will be viewed by the mar-
ket as a favorable signal. Using Canadian data,
they find that the forecasters have favorable and
noticeable impact on the degree of underpricing.
In most IPO studies, the degree of underpricing is
a reflection of market information asymmetry.
Thus, the result of Jog & McConomy (2003) im-
plies that earnings forecasts disclosure reduces IPO
market information asymmetry. Using market to
book ratio at day 1 as a relative IPO value, Keasey
& McGuiness (2008) find that forecasters are val-
ued higher than non-forecasters. The favorable
effect of earnings forecast continued to post-IPO
return performance for the forecasters. In more
recent study, Hartnett (2010) investigates the re-
lationship between forecasting and firm value and
finds that, to some degree, there is a positive rela-
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tionship between the earnings forecasts and the
firm value.
Evidence show that IPO earnings forecast
accuracy varies among the countries (e.g., Lee, et
al, 1993; Firth, 1998). Hartnett & Romcke (2000)
summarize nine IPO studies and find that the fore-
cast accuracy varies across firm age, size, forecast
interval, industry, leverage, agent quality, and
other factors. Jaggi, et al (2006) classify the rela-
tive forecast accuracy as pessimistic and optimis-
tic forecasts. When the forecasted earnings are
higher than the actual ones, the relative accuracy
is classified as optimistic forecast, while the fore-
casted earnings are lower than the actual ones is
classified as pessimistic forecast. In relation to the
IPO performance, Gounopoulos (2011) also con-
cludes that firms with negative earnings forecast
(pessimistic) are associated with low level of ini-
tial returns, while optimistic management earning
forecast for an IPO is associated with high initial
returns. In the longer period, Jelic, et al. (2001)
find that optimistic forecasters tend to
underperform the market during the first 12
months after listing. Kao, et al. (2009) report that
in Chinese IPO market, overoptimistic forecast
have lower first day returns and the worst post-
IPO stock performance. These findings imply that
failure to meet earnings forecast could affect the
investors’ pricing decision. Furthermore, Cormier
& Martinez (2006) assert that the forecast also
serves as benchmark against actual financial re-
sults when investors evaluate the firm’s earnings
performance, thus creating an implicit contract
between the managers and investors. Hence, in-
vestors could use the earnings forecast accuracy
in evaluating the managers’ performance.
Prior studies show that managers are aware
that forecast accuracy could affect their credibil-
ity. They put efforts to achieve the earnings tar-
get. Using Taiwan data, Jaggi, et al (2006) exam-
ines the effect of the forecasts to managers’ be-
havior to anticipate the forecast accuracy. They use
the relative forecast errors to make a differentia-
tion between the optimistic and the pessimistic
forecasters, then, observe the manager behavior
in earnings management. They find that the IPO
earnings forecast is more accurate after it becomes
mandatory in Taiwanese market. However, fur-
ther analysis shows that the low errors in the man-
datory environment in Taiwan are a result of in-
creasing earning management practices to meet the
earnings forecasts.
Kasznik (1999) argues that minimizing fore-
cast bias could be achieved either by revising earn-
ing forecast or by manipulating reported profit
using discretionary accrual. A manager tends to
use alternative to decrease the forecast bias, par-
ticularly optimistic forecast, by adjusting reported
profit using discretionary accrual, instead of re-
vising preliminary earning forecast. In case of op-
timistic forecast, Kasznik (1999) states that down-
ward revision is avoided because it can send nega-
tive signal to the market, which can result nega-
tive toward manager credibility. While in conser-
vative (pessimistic) forecast, a manager adjust
earnings forecast upward or adjust reported profit
downward and create supply “cookie jar” to be used
in the next period. The choices between forecast
revisions and earning management will be made;
it depends on situation and purpose accomplish-
ment under this circumstances.
Earnings Management and IPO
Healy & Wahlen (1999) suggest that earning
management has a wide understanding because
there are three important aspects in it. First, is it is
seen that there will be many reasons or justifica-
tions emerged by manager to influence various
reasons to predict any events in the future, such
as machine usage time, long term asset salvage
value, tax delay or loss as a result of bad debt.
The second point is that profit management is used
to describe something unreal to stock holders (to
mislead stock holders) or some levels of stock
holders about the actual economic activities. This
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could happen if some stock holders do not have
capability of revealing or some do not care about
profit management practice. The third point is jus-
tification done by manager to use profit manage-
ment is implied not only benefits but also cost. It
means profit management has two direct implica-
tions, which are cost and benefit. Healy & Wahlen
(1999) divide motivation which is based the profit
management into three groups. The first is stock
market motivation which is shown with stock re-
turn. Secondly, it is contract motivation in debt
covenant or management compensation covenant.
Lastly, it is motivated by political cost avoidance.
There have been many studies investigating
the earnings management conducted prior to IPO.
Li, et al (2006) argue that earnings management is
a specific instrument used by managers in order
to price the IPO such to get IPO proceeds target.
Several empirical studies find evidence that sev-
eral years before IPO, companies did manage their
earnings, so that they were able to set “rational”
offer prices at IPO (e.g., Teoh, Welch, & Wong,
1998; Roosenboom, van der Goot, Mertens; 2003).
However, not all similar studies find the same re-
sults. Using IPO Indonesian data, there are some
conflicting results. While Rahman & Hutagaol
(2008) find that firms manage their earnings
through discretionary accrual prior to IPO,
Warganegara & Indriastari (2009) do not find
enough evidence to support the former. They ar-
gue that the demand for higher quality of finan-
cial reports from public investors in Indonesia
somehow has pushed companies to improve their
reporting quality. Using a different method in
detecting the managers’ behavior managing their
earnings, Oktorina & Hutagaol (2009) find that
Indonesian manufacturing companies tend to man-
age their earnings through manipulation of real
activities.
Kao, et al. (2009) investigate the impact of
pricing regulation in Chinese market and the man-
agers’ opportunistic behavior. They find that pric-
ing regulations, somehow, has reduced the opti-
mism in earnings forecasts. However, the regula-
tions have induced companies to inflate pre-IPO
earnings and, in turn, affect the post-IPO perfor-
mance negatively.
Prior studies discussed above observe man-
agers’ opportunistic behavior prior to IPO. Kasznik
(1999) examines whether managers also manipu-
late their earnings after the IPO. His and other
studies (Magnan & Cormier, 1997 and Gramlich &
Sorensen, 2004) find the robust evidence for man-
agers who release earnings forecast at IPO.
Cormier & Martinez (2006) explain that managers
of forecaster IPOs have incentives to manage their
earnings after the IPO, particularly towards the
end of IPO year in order to avoid a negative earn-
ings surprise. Another motive to explain the post-
IPO earnings management is that managers try to
protect their reputation as credible information
producer. With this elucidation, the earnings are
managed so that the forecast accuracy is suffi-
ciently low.
Beside the main motivation of earnings man-
agement is to protect their reputation, the discre-
tionary accruals – as an earnings management in-
dicator – are also influenced by other factors, such
as audit quality, ownership structure, firm size,
and firm’s leverage level.
Krishnan (2003) argues that high quality au-
ditors are more likely to identify dubious account-
ing practices and report irregularities than low
quality auditors. Confirming prior study by
Becker, et al. (1998), he finds that Big 6 clients
show lower discretionary accruals than non-Big 6
clients.
The likelihood of managers practicing earn-
ings management is also influenced by how the
firm governed. Klein (2002) finds that the exist-
ence of independent audit committee and board
of committee is negatively related to abnormal
accruals. Using Chinese data, Liu & Lu (2007) find
systematic evidence demonstrating the positive
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impact of corporate governance level and earn-
ings managements.
Siregar & Utama (2008) argue that larger
firms are more easily scrutinized by investors or
regulators than smaller firms; therefore it is ex-
pected to engage in less opportunistic earnings
management than the latter. Teoh, et al (1998) find
that larger firms tend to have less discretionary
accruals than their counterparts.
Watts & Zimmerman (1990) states that man-
agers from high leveraged-firms tend to choose
accounting procedures that shift earnings that sup-
posedly reported in future period to the current
period. This is to show to the debt holders (and
shareholders) that firms have a capability to pay
interests and the debts. However, Cormier &
Martinez (2006) argue that in an IPO context, the
higher level of leverage is associated to smaller
equity financing, therefore there is less needs for
managers to manage investors’ perceptions with
discretionary accruals. This study uses leverage
as a control variable to earnings management.
Cormier & Martinez (2006) argue that earn-
ings management in IPO could exist after the IPOs.
In line with it, this study is purported to examine
whether earnings forecast in IPO prospectuses in-
duce earnings management after IPO. The argu-
ment of post-IPO earnings management is the
management motive to achieve the earnings tar-
get disclosed in the IPO prospectuses. Disclosing
earnings forecast in prospectus could be seen as
management’s promise to shareholders that com-
pany will provide a certain future income at the
end of IPO year. In order to protect their reputa-
tion, managers put their best efforts to meet the
target. Closing to the end of IPO year, managers
would know whether earnings forecast could be
achieved or not. If it is likely not achieved (ag-
gressive forecast), there is sufficient motive to
manage the earnings upwardly. On the other hand,
if actual earning is likely to exceed the target (con-
servative forecast), managers still have a motive
to manage earnings downwardly. Based on the
authors’ knowledge, there is no study, using In-
donesia data, investigating the post-IPO earnings
management. Therefore, this study contributes
new insight regarding the management behavior
on managing their earnings after IPO.
This study finds that there is no significant
evidence to support that there is a difference earn-
ings management practices between the forecast-
ers and non forecasters. However, a significant
difference is found among forecasters. The results
shows that optimistic forecasters tend to engage
more in more earning management through dis-
cretionary accrual than conservative forecasters.
This study also finds that the presence of high
audit quality does not deter managers’ behavior
in managing post-IPO earnings through discretion-
ary accruals.
This paper is structured as follow. A review
of prior literature in earnings forecast and earn-
ings management in IPO will be presented and is
followed by hypotheses development. The re-
search design presents the sample and data analy-
sis used in this study. Next is the findings and
discussion section, then the paper is closed by a
conclusion section.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
This research argues that earnings manage-
ment in IPO could happen prior to and/or after
the IPO. The managers’ motive to conduct earn-
ings management prior to the IPO is to influence
pre-IPO earnings, achieve favorable P/E ratio, and
manage the targeted IPO offer price. Meanwhile,
post-IPO earnings management is purported to
increase forecast accuracy (lower forecast bias) at
the end of IPO year. This is provoked by manag-
ers’ motive to maintain their credibility in volun-
tary disclosure, in particular earnings forecast. The
timeline of after-IPO earnings management could
be drawn as presented in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. After-IPO Earnings Management Timeline
Since the motivation of post-IPO is to increase
forecast accuracy, it is expected that forecasters
are more likely to manage their post-IPO earnings
than the non-forecaster. Thus, the first hypothesis
could be stated as follow,
H1: The forecasters tend to manage their post-IPO
earnings compared to the non-forecasters
Among the forecasters, this research argues
that optimistic forecasters will have higher moti-
vation to manipulate their earnings since they have
higher probability that the IPO earnings forecast
cannot be achieved at the end of IPO year. There-
fore, it is expected that the optimistic forecasters
are more likely to engage in the earnings manage-
ment practice than conservative forecasters. Fur-
thermore, the relationship between forecast accu-
racy and earnings management is strengthen in
optimistic forecast cases.
H2: Optimistic forecasters tend to manage their
post-IPO earnings compared to conservative
forecasters and strengthen the forecast accu-
racy and post-IPO earnings management re-
lationship.
Prior research shows that audit quality in-
fluences the existence and magnitude of earnings
management indicator. This research chooses au-
dit quality as a moderating variable in the fore-
cast accuracy and earnings management relation-
ship. The presence of high audit quality is expected
to weaken the forecast accuracy-earnings manage-
ment relationship.
H3: High audit quality will weaken the relation-
ship between forecast accuracy and post-IPO
earnings management
Other control variables used in this study
are ownership structure, firm size, and leverage
which are expected to have significant relation-
ship with earnings management practices.
METHOD
This study is an explanatory study aiming
to explain the relationship between research vari-
ables. The scope of the study is limited to IPO firms
that went public in IDX during year 2000-2010.
EF made EF announced
IPO
AE revealed
End of IPO year
Post -IPO EM
Table 1. Percentage of Forecaster Companies per Year
Year IPO Companies Final sample Forecaster 
2000 17 17 13 
2001 32 31 27 
2002 15 15 15 
2003 6 6 4 
2004 12 11 9 
2005 7 7 6 
2006 8 8 6 
2007 23 23 10 
2008 15 15 2 
2009 12 12 2 
2010 20 20 2 
 
A total of 167 firms went public during 2000-
2010 (see table 1). However, only 165 IPO pro-
spectuses can be collected and retrieved in which
96 are forecasters. The table shows that in the later
years, less firms disclosing earnings forecasts at
their IPOs. An explanation to the fact is that start-
ing in 2007, there is a trend of pricing the IPO us-
ing the book building method in Indonesia mar-
ket. This method allows the issuers to announce
their offer price in a price range, and then decide
its final offer price after they conduct the road
shows, in which the issuers and underwriters are
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able to gather information from potential institu-
tional investors regarding the demand of their IPO
shares.
Sample IPOs are classified as forecaster or
non-forecaster, based on the existence of earnings
forecasts in the IPO prospectuses. Then, based on
end of IPO year forecast bias, the forecaster sub-
sample is divided into optimistic and conserva-
tive forecasters. Optimistic forecasters are ones
producing positive forecast bias (earnings forecast
is higher than post-IPO actual earnings), while
conservative forecasters are ones producing nega-
tive forecast bias (earnings forecast is lower than
post-IPO actual earnings).
There are several research variables used to
test the research hypothesis. First variable is earn-
ings forecast accuracy (EFA). Forecast accuracy is
defined as the deviation of earnings forecasts from
actual post-IPO earnings. It is calculated using the
equation (1) below,
Where, TAit is total accrual, measured by the
difference between sales and net income (earnings)
at the end of IPO year. “ Salesit is change in Sales at
the end of IPO year. CFit-1 is lagged cash flow from
operation. PPEit is level of property, plant and
equipment at the end of IPO year. The TA model
above will be calculated for all research samples.
The residual (åi) of equation (2) is used as a proxy
for discretionary accrual (DA) – a measure for
earnings management.
The t-tests are conducted to test the differ-
ence mean of DA between the forecasters and non-
forecasters, optimistic and conservative forecast-
ers.
The impact of forecast accuracy on manag-
ers’ behavior in earnings management is examined
using a multivariate model. Several control vari-
ables are included in the model in order to con-
trol their significant impacts on the earnings man-
agement. The research model used is expressed in
equation (3) below.)1.........(........................................
i
ii
i AE
AEEFEFA 
Where, EFAi is earnings forecast accuracy of
IPOi, EFi is earnings forecast of IPOi disclosed in
the IPO prospectus, AEi is post-IPO actual earn-
ings of IPOi at the end of IPO years. To test the
second research hypothesis, this research uses
Forecast bias (FB), which is the relative form of
EFA. IPO with positive FB is categorized as opti-
mistic forecaster, while ones with negative FB is
categorized as conservative forecaster.
Following Cormier & Martinez (2006), Jones
(1991) modified accrual model is used to proxy
the indicator of managers’ opportunistic behavior
in earnings management. It excludes negative earn-
ings dummy used in Cormier & Martinez (2006)
since less than 10% of IPO sample reported a loss
after IPO. The equation (2) expresses the Total
Accrual (TA) model used.
)2.(..........3121 iitititit PPECFSalesTA   
)3......(.....................   *
*
8765
4320
ititititit
itititititiit
LevSizeOwnDAudEFA
DAudDOptEFADOptEFADA




DAit is discretionary accruals of IPOi at the
end of IPO year. EFAit is forecast accuracy of IPOi
at the end of IPO year. DOptit is a dummy variable
for optimistic forecasters (1 for positive forecast
bias (FB) and 0 otherwise). DAuditit is a dummy
variable for audit quality (1 for IPO sample au-
dited by Big 4, and 0 otherwise). Ownit is percent-
age of IPOi’s shares sold to public at IPO. Sizeit is
normal log of total asset of IPOi at the end of IPO
year.
FINDINGS
Forecast Accuracy
As shown in Table 1, about 58.2% of sample
is forecasters. At the end of IPO year, the forecast
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accuracy and bias are calculated. The result is
shown in Table 2 below.
after IPO. Mathematically, discretionary accrual is
the standardized residual of TA model (equation
2). For all IPO sample, the regression equation for
TA model is:
TAit = 20.70 + 0.090  Salesit – 0.714 CFit-1 + 0.069
PPEit
(0.874) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026)
The average of model residuals for all IPO
sample is approximately zero. From 165 IPO
sample, 125 IPO produced negative discretionary
accruals and 40 IPO produced positive discretion-
ary accruals. This result indicates that more than
75% of IPO sample tried to manage their earnings
downward. This is quite surprising as the fore-
cast accuracy shows that more than two thirds of
samples are optimistic forecasters, who, reason-
ably, have a motive to manage their earnings up-
ward. However, when the sample is grouped on
the forecasters and the forecast accuracy (Table
3), the result is more explainable.
Table 3. Average Discretionary Accrual of IPO Samples
Sample N Average Forecast Accuracy (Bias) 
All forecasters 96 0.4905 
 (0.2665) 
Optimistic forecasters 63 0.5406  
(0.5406) 
Conservative forecasters 33 0.3919  
(-0.3919) 
 
Table 2. Forecast Accuracy (Bias) of IPO Sample
Table 2 above shows that 64 forecasters are
optimistic (forecasters whose earnings forecasters
cannot be achieved at the end of IPO year with
average forecast upward bias 54.06%. It means that
around two thirds of forecasters have forecasted
their earnings at IPI higher than they would achieve
months after forecasted made. Around one third
of forecasters are conservative when they fore-
casted their earnings at the IPO with the accuracy
around 39.19%. Since the accuracy is measured by
dispersion of forecasted earnings from actual earn-
ings, the result should be understood as the lower
the measure, the more accurate is the forecasts.
The result shows that conservative forecaster is
more accurate than optimistic forecaster.
If it is assumed that managers always try to
protect their reputation as credible information
produces, they would have manage their earnings
towards the end of year, so they could have lower
forecast bias (higher accuracy). However, the re-
sult above does not provide an indication that
earnings management conducted, if any, is to serve
the managers’ reputation protection.
Discretionary Accrual
As discussed above, this research uses dis-
cretionary accrual as an indicator of managers’
opportunistic behavior in managing their earnings
Sample N 
Average of 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
All sample 165 0.000 
Forecasters 96 0.0231 
Non-forecasters 69 -0.0322 
Optimistic forecasters 63 0.0332 
Conservative forecasters 33 -0.1353 
 1 The t-test results of DA means for forecasters and non-forecasters show that
both DA means are not different to zero at  = 5%. The result of two sample
t-test for mean difference confirms that the difference means between
forecasters and non-forecasters is not different to zero at  = 5%.
2 The t-test results of DA means for Optimistic and Conservative forecasters
show that both DA means are different to zero at  = 10%. The result two
sample t-test for mean difference confirms that the difference means between
Optimistic and Conservative forecaster is slightly significant at  = 10%.
Table 3 indicates that there is a different
motive of earnings management between the fore-
casters and non-forecasters. The forecasters have
an average of positive DA, while non-forecasters
have an average negative DA. This could imply
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that, on average, forecasters have a motive to
manage their earnings upward after IPO. Mean-
while, the non-forecasters appear to manage their
earnings downwardly. However, the statistical test
to test the means difference between forecasters
and non-forecasters fails to reject the null hypoth-
esis. It can be concluded that, although an appar-
ent difference in discretionary accrual, the test
result confirms that the difference is statistically
insignificant. Therefore, there is not enough evi-
dence to support that forecasters are more likely
to engage in post-IPO earnings management prac-
tices. This finding does not confirm prior findings
found by Cormier & Martinez (2006).
Table 3 also reports the average of discre-
tionary accrual for optimistic and conservative
forecasters. This research posits that to protect
their reputation, managers of optimistic forecast-
ers tend to manage their post-IPO earnings more
than conservative forecasters. Table 3 shows that,
on average, optimistic forecasters have a positive
DA that indicates a motive of increasing income,
while conservative forecasters, on average, have
a negative DA that indicated a motive of decreas-
ing income. This fact is in line with theoretical
framework developed in this research. The statis-
tical tests for means of both sub-samples of fore-
casters cannot confirm significant earnings man-
agement practice. However, the test for mean dif-
ference between both sub-samples is significant at
 = 10%. It implies that optimistic forecasters man-
age their post-IPO earnings differently to conser-
vative forecasters. Based on the sign of DA, opti-
mistic forecasters tend to manage their earnings
upwardly, while conservative forecasters manage
their downwardly.
The inference of descriptive statistics above
could be used as an indication of the managers’
behavior in earnings management upon their fore-
cast accuracy. To test the impact of the forecast
accuracy on the managers’ behavior managing their
post-IPO earnings, a more through analysis is con-
ducted using a research model presented in pre-
vious section (eq.3). A cross-section analysis al-
lows this study to include all considerable vari-
ables to interact in a model.
Table 4 below presents the descriptive sta-
tistics of research variables of forecasters sub-
sample used in the research model. As mentioned
earlier, on average the forecasters show an aver-
age positive DA. The median shows a negative
DA showing that more than half forecasters man-
age their earnings downwardly. The earnings fore-
cast accuracy shows an average of absolute bias of
50.7%. The table also shows that more than half
forecasters are optimistic forecasters. It also shows
that majority of forecasters are audited by non-
Big 4 auditor. On average, the public owns around
24.7% forecasters shares at IPO. It indicates that
public is not the majority shareholders. The fore-
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviasi Min. Max. 
DA 0.023 -0.083 0.175 -0.215 0.835 
EFA 0.507 0.232 0.808 0.002 4.293 
DposFB - 1.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
EFA*DposFB 0.373 0.141 0.693 0.000 4.129 
DAud - 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
EFA*DAud 0.196 0.000 0.610 0.000 4.129 
Public 0.247 0.245 0.109 0.070 0.500 
Size 25.971 25.753 1.498 23.076 30.293 
Lev 0.432 0.399 0.260 0.002 0.950 
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casters show a vary leverage profile. It ranges
from 0.2% (almost no debt) to 95% (heavily le-
vered firm) leverage.
Next is the discussion of the cross section
analysis. Table 5 below shows the regression analy-
sis result. This study conducts several analyses to
examine the impact of forecast accuracy and the
post-IPO earnings management practice. Firstly, a
shorter model is analyzed. It includes only the
forecast accuracy (EFA) and the dummy variables
for Optimistic forecasters and audit quality. The
result is presented in column 2.
accurate the forecast (the more deviate forecast
from actual post-IPO earnings, in absolute term)
the more discretionary accrual conducted to man-
age post-IPO earnings. This result is in line with
findings from Kasznik (1999) and Cormier &
Martinez (2006).
Results in column 2 also show that two
dummy variables of optimistic forecast and audit
quality are significantly related to the discretion-
ary accrual. Optimistic forecasters show a positive
coefficient implying that there is tendency of they
manage their post-IPO earnings upwardly to meet
the forecasts made at the IPO. The coefficient for
audit quality dummy takes a positive value, mean-
ing that more discretionary accrual detected from
higher quality financial reports as a result of Big 4
auditing process. This result is not of expected.
The short model analysis concludes that all ex-
pected result is proven that forecast accuracy has
a significant impact on the managers’ opportunis-
tic behavior to manage post-IPO earnings. Opti-
mistic forecasters tend to engage in earnings man-
agement upwardly. However, the presence of
high audit quality does not reduce the managers’
engagement in post-IPO earnings management.
Column 3 of Table 5 above reports the ex-
tended model by inclusion of control variables,
ownership structure, firm size, and firm leverage
level. After controlling for the effects of those vari-
ables, the constant becomes significant. It shows
that on average the forecasters do manage their
earnings after the IPOs. The negative sign of the
constant describes that on average, the motive of
post-IPO earnings management is more toward the
decreasing income. The Variables EFA and DOpt
retains their signs and significance. Variable DAud
retains its sign, but appears to be insignificant.
The result in column 3 shows that variable
Own takes a negative coefficient, however, it
comes insignificantly. The result is in line with
Cormier & Martinez (2006). This insignificant could
be explained as discussed above that public is not
Table 5. Regression Analysis Results
Note: * significant at =10%; **significant at =5%;
*** significant at =1%
The result shows that the short model is valid
(F-stat = 5.896, p-value = 0.00). Simultaneously,
forecast accuracy and dummy variables optimistic
and audit quality explain 16.8% of discretionary
accrual variation. The model shows that forecast
accuracy significantly influenced the tendency of
managers to manage post-IP0 earnings. The coef-
ficient takes a positive sign implying that the less
Variable Coefficient (p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Constant -0.031 
(0.36) 
-0.977*** 
(0.01) 
-0.975*** 
(0.00) 
EFA 0.062*** 
(0.00) 
0.060*** 
(0.01) 
0.073** 
(0.04) 
DOpt 0.081** 
(0.03) 
0.083** 
(0.02) 
0.045 
(0.26) 
EFA*DOpt - - 0.090* 
(0.07) 
DAud 0.082** 
(0.02) 
0.037 
(0.29) 
-0.004 
(0.92) 
EFA*DAud - - 0.095** 
(0.05) 
Own - -0.149 
(0.33) 
-0.149 
(0.36) 
Size - 0.041*** 
(0.00) 
0.040*** 
(0.00) 
Lev - -0.120 
(0.09) 
-0.104 
(0.14) 
Adj R-square 0.168 0.287 0.327 
F-stat 5.896*** 
(0.00) 
5.645*** 
(0.00) 
4.970*** 
(0.00) 
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the majority shareholders of forecaster firms.
Therefore, the power of public to direct and moni-
tor managers’ behavior in discretionary accruals
is limited. Variable Size shows a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient. This implies that the bigger
forecasters tend to engage more in discretionary
accruals. This is not as expected since this study
posits that because of the media coverage, the big
firms tend to avoid in earnings management prac-
tices through discretionary accruals. The result
implies that big forecasters are more engaged in
managing post-IPO earnings. One possible expla-
nation is that big firms are more concerned of pro-
tecting their reputation; therefore they are will-
ing to practice earnings management through dis-
cretionary accruals. Variable Lev appears to be
insignificant. Since the forecasters firms has a wide
range of leverage, its impact on how managers’
engagement in discretionary accruals are lacked
of significant directions.
DISCUSSION
So far, the main hypothesis: forecast accu-
racy influences managers’ opportunistic behavior
in managing their post-IPO earnings is supported
by the result of short and extended models. Fur-
ther analysis is carried out to test the second hy-
pothesis. The full model allows this study to in-
vestigate the strength of the forecast accuracy-earn-
ings management relationship in the presence of
nature of forecast bias and audit quality. The re-
sult of the full model is presented in the last col-
umn of Table 5.
The result shows that, on average, the fore-
casters conducted post-IPO earnings management
(Coefficient of Constant is significant at p-value =
0.00). Furthermore, negative coefficient shows that
forecasters manage their post-IPO earnings down-
wardly. Forecast accuracy shows its significant
impact on discretionary accruals with a positive
direction. It implies that the less accurate the fore-
cast will force managers to conduct discretionary
accrual to manage post-IPO earnings upwardly.
In this analysis, that relationship are moderated
by the nature of forecast bias and audit quality.
The interactive term of forecast accuracy and
optimistic forecaster (EFA*DOpt) shows a positive
and significant coefficient. It means that the posi-
tive relationship of forecast accuracy and earnings
management is strengthened in case of optimistic
forecasters. This result is in line with Cormier &
Martinez (2006). This result provides a support for
the second hypothesis.
In the full model analysis (column 4), the
result shows similar inferences with the extended
model (column 3). The interactive terms
(EFA*DOpt and EFA*DAud) show significant re-
sults. The EFA*DOpt coefficient is positive and
significant, implying that the optimist managers
tend to manage their earnings upward even more,
compared to the conservative managers. The
dummy variable, DAud, shows a negative coeffi-
cient, which indicates that, the earnings manage-
ment of forecasters audited by Big4 auditors tend
to be less. However the result of interactive term
is of forecast accuracy and audit quality
(EFA*DAud) shows a positive and significant co-
efficient. It implies that the relationship between
forecast accuracy and earnings management is
strengthen, rather than weaken, by audit quality.
This is not as expected. The finding regarding the
high audit quality, to some degree, has raised a
question of the role of Big4 in conducting audit-
ing process in Indonesia.
Similar to the extended model analysis, the
full model analysis reports that from control vari-
ables, only firm size is significantly related to man-
agers’ action in post-IPO discretionary accrual.
Ownership structure and firm’s leverage appear
to be insignificantly related to earnings manage-
ment.
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Prior to go public, managers attempt many
ways to attract potential investors to buy firms’
shares at the IPO. One way used in IDX is to issue
earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectus. This fore-
cast is aimed to guide the potential investors in
pricing the IPO. However, this voluntary disclo-
sure becomes a target for managers to achieve it
at the end of IPO year. In order to protect their
reputation, managers put their best efforts to
achieve the earnings target. Months prior to the
end of year, managers would know whether the
earnings target would be achieved or not. There-
fore, there is an incentive to manage the post-IPO
earnings to meet the target.
The study results conclude that there is no
enough evidence to prove that IIPO firms in IDX
during 2000-2010 conducting post-IPO earnings
management through discretionary accruals. Al-
though there is an indication that forecasters are
engaged more in discretionary accruals compared
to non-forecasters, but the difference is not sig-
nificant. However, this study finds that there is a
slightly significant difference among forecasters.
The optimistic forecasters tend to engage more in
managing their post-IPO earnings management
upwardly. This study also finds that the forecast
accuracy does have a significant impact on influ-
encing managers’ behavior to manage their post-
IPO earnings through discretionary accruals. The
less accurate the forecast, the more managers en-
gaged in earnings management practice. This re-
lationship is strengthen is optimistic forecast cases,
but weaken in the presence of high audit quality.
This is a surprising result and it raises an issue of
the Big 4 role in audit business in Indonesia.
Firm size, is the only control variables that
is significantly related to the earnings manage-
ment. Ownership structure and firm’s leverage
appears to be insignificantly related to earnings
management practices in Indonesia. This finding
opens further avenue to investigate the corporate
governance issue in detecting earnings manage-
ment through discretionary accruals.
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